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EQUITY
By

HENRY L. NMCCLINTOCK*

Insofar as practicable, the arrangement followed by Professors Hilkey
and Hall in the review of equity in the survey for 1949-1950, will be
followed, but the differences in the subject matter of the equity cases decided during the two periods necessarily requires many changes in that arrangement. During this past year, as during the one preceding it, the
Georgia cases dealing with equity have been concerned mainly with the
application of established equity principles to various fact situations; there
has been substantially no occasion for the consideration of new principles.
In this survey only cases which discuss or apply equity principles as such
will be considered. Decisions as to the substantive legal rights of the parties
are not considered though they may have been rendered in suits for equitable relief.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

Contracts Specifically Enforceabl.-Two cases, both decided the same
day, considered the question of the certainty of terms required for specific
performance of a contract. Neither case discussed whether the requirement
in equity differed from that at law. Hulgan v. Gledhill' held that a contract to build a house for petitioner which did not show the kind of house
to be built, nor its value, was too indefinite to be specifically enforced. It
would seem to be clear that it was also too indefinite to be valid at law.
The court also held that a promise by petitioner that members of the
C.C.C. under his direction would perform work for defendant was illegal
and that its illegality invalidated the entire contract. Faulkner v. McKelvey' held that a description of the property as a "brick building known as
the Old Post Office Building in Bartow County" was sufficiently certain
for specific performance in connection with evidence that vendor owned
only one building in that county that answered the description, thus aligning Georgia with those jurisdictions adopting the modern rule that the
terms were certain if they could be made certain by evidence.
Ogletree v. Ingram & LeGrand Lumber Co.' followed two earlier Georgia cases in holding that a petition for specific enforcement of a contract
for the sale of property which did not show the value of the property was
demurrable for failing to allege the fairness of the contract, which is
essential for specific performance.
Tender by Plaintiff.-Smith v. Tippins4 was a suit for specific performance of a contract made at an administrator's sale. The court held that
*Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University; Professor
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where the petitioner, purchaser, offered to close the sale within the time
required, but the administrator refused because of objection by the heirs,
neither the administrator nor the heirs could defeat the relief because of
failure to make tender within the required time.
Laches.-Gay v. Radford' was a suit by an heir at law to enforce a bond
for title given to his ancestor. After holding that the bond created an
equitable interest in the land which descended to the heir, the court held
that that heir was not chargeable with laches during his minority if no
guardian had been appointed for him, because the statute of limitations
did not run against a minor, and that a delay of four years after reaching
his majority was not laches.
On the other hand, a delay of nine years after the youngest plaintiff
had attained majority was held' to justify the dismissal of a suit for
specific performance of a contract to adopt minor children, where, in the
meantime, the alleged promisor had died, thereby depriving defendant of
the benefit of his evidence. This case illustrates the principle that laches
is not a matter of mere delay, but of delay which prejudices the other
party.
Adequate Remedy at La.-In
none of the cases decided this past
year has there been any discussion of the principles governing the adequacy
of the legal remedy; the court has been content merely to hold the remedy
to be inadequate or otherwise under the doctrine of earlier cases cited by
it. A petition' seeking a lien for labor and materials furnished by a supplier
to a subcontractor for the erection of a building, which did not allege
that the subcontractor who employed petitioner to do the work was insolvent or a nonresident, failed to show that the remedy against the subcontractor for breach of contract was inadequate so that the petition was
properly dismissed against the owner and the general contractor. The
cases cited to sustain this ruling turned on the right to the lien, rather
than the adequacy of the remedy at law.
In Ware v. Martin,' the court held that the petition for a share in an
estate by an adopted daughter alleged a completed adoption, not a contract to adopt, and, therefore, petitioner had an adequate remedy at law.
Chadwick v. Dolinoff" was a suit for specific enforcement of a promise
by a former employee not to compete with petitioner for a limited period.
The contract contained a provision for liquidated damages it case of its
breach. The order of the trial court sustaining a demurrer to the petition
was affirmed. The Supreme Court cited in support of its decision several
cases sustaining the provision for liquidated damages and others laying
down the general principle that there will be no specific performance
granted if there is an adequate remedy at law. It further stated that WJells
v. First Nat. Exhibitors' Circuitl° did not require a different ruling. In the
Wells case, the court examined on theory and precedent the question whether a provision for liquidated damages made the remedy at law adequate and
5.
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207 Ga. 38, 59 S.E.2d 915 (1950).
Hagler v. Hagler, 207 Ga. 239, 60 S.E.2d 378 (1950).
Maggi v. Sylvan Circle Apts., Inc. 207 Ga. 580, 63 S.E.2d 368 (1951).
207 Ga. 512, 63 S.E.2d 335 (1951).
207 Ga. 702, 64 S.E.2d 76 (1951).
149 Ga. 200, 99 S.E. 615 (1919).
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held, in accord with the great weight of authority, that it did not. The
Chadwick case can be reconciled with the Wells case only on the ground
that in the former there was no showing that the remedy at law would have
been inadequate even in the absence of the provision for liquidated damages. On that ground the case is in line with the practice' of our court to
apply rigidly the principle that a petition for equitable relief must show
that there is no adequate remedy at law, by alleging facts that show the
inadequacy, not merely by alleging it as a conclusion.
PARTITION

A petition for equitable partition and sale, and for an accounting,"
brought by one cotenant against another, which alleged that defendant
had appropriated the proceeds from the land, including those from the
sale of timber; that the property Could not be equably divided because of
the- improvements thereon; and that the suit was brought as soon as
petitioner learned that the timber had been sold and the cotenant was
denying her title was sufficient against a general demurrer based on the
grounds of limitations and laches, and adequacy of remedy at law.
RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF PROPERTY

Use of Land.-In two cases decided on the same day, the Supreme
Court held that a grantee from a former owner of land who had imposed
restrictions on the use of a lot conveyed to defendant could enforce the
restriction against the defendant; 2 and that a restrictive covenant on the
use of land subsequently leased to defendant could be enforced against
defendant." 3 In the former case, the court stated as its reason that the
restriction became an easement, or a servitude in the nature of an easement
for the benefit of the property subsequently conveyed to petitioner and
which accompanied the land into the hands of petitioner, while in the
second case the reason assigned was that the defendant-lessee, who had
notice of the restriction was in "privity of conscience" with the covenantor.
Thus the court relied on the same day on each of the two theories, contract right, or right attached to land, which have been advanced" from
the time of Tulk v. Moxhay 15 to the present time to subject those not parties
to the use restriction to its obligations, or to extend to them its benefits.
In neither case was there any consideration of the merits of the different
theories, and in both cases the result would have been the same whichever
theory was adopted. In the Spencer case the court also held that a reference
in defendant's deed to a plat which, in turn, referred to a recorded list of
restrictions, charged defendant with notice of the restrictions, even though
the list was not a recordable instrument.
11. Ballenger v. Houston, 207 Ga. 438, 62 S.E.2d 189 (1950).
12. Spencer v. Poole, 207 Ga. 155, 60 S.E.2d 371 (1950).
13. Langenback v. Mays, 207 Ga. 156, 60 S.E.2d 240 (1950).
14. See Reno, Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes, 28 VA. L. REV. 951, 972 ff.
(1942).
15. 2 Ph. 774, 1 H. & T. 105, 18 L.J. Ch. 83, 12 L.T. (o.s.) 469, 13 Jur. (o.s.) 89, 41
Eng. Reprint 1143 (1848).
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In Stanley v. Greenfield,16 the court held that the fact that defendant
had expended $8,ooo on the construction of a house which violated a building restriction did not "estop" plaintiff from suing to enjoin the completion of the house in the absence of evidence that plaintiff knew of the construction before he brought suit. The case also held that where the petition prayed for an injunction against the completion of the house, a prayer
for general relief did not authorize an injunction against the use of the
house in its present condition.
REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS

No Georgia case decided this past year has considered the right to
reform a legal instrument. In Barron v. Dardenl" it was held that a suit
to reform a deed was barred by laches when it was brought 22 years after
the execution of the deed and 20 years after it was recorded, and after the
death of the parties to it, who alone could testify as to their intent; in
the absence of proof as to a scrivener; and after conveyances had been
made to third parties.
RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS

Negligence of Petitioner.-A petition to cancel for fraud a contract
signed by petitioner who alleged inability to read the instrument and ignorance of its contents is insufficient in the absence of allegations of misrepresentations by the defendant or confidential relations between the par-

ties."8
Statement of Opinion.-In a petition to set aside for fraud a release
executed by petitioner, and to recover damages for the death of petitioner's husband, allegations that defendant's claim agent falsely stated that
defendant was not liable for the death alleged a statement merely as to
matters of opinion on which petitioner was not entitled to rely, and, therefore, were insufficient to authorize cancellation."

Duress.-Calhoun v. Dowdy2 ° was a suit to cancel for duress a deed
conveying land to defendant. The petition alleged that defendant and his
mother and step-father colluded to secure the execution of the deed, and
that the latter two took petitioner to town to have it executed. When they
were crossing a river the other two threatened to throw petitioner into
the river if she did not agree to convey the land, and she promised to do
so. The deed was executed in the presence of an attorney in the town, but
not delivered until the threats were renewed as the parties approached the
river on the way home. The court held that a threat to life, in order to
constitute duress must be made with apparent ability to carry it out. Here
there was no such ability when the deed was executed in the presence of
the attorney, but there was when the deed was delivered, and that was
enough. There can be no disagreement with the result, but the dictum
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

207 Ga. 390, 61 S.E.2d 818 (1950).
207 Ga. 350, 61 S.E.2d 497 (1950).
Robertson v. Panlos, 208 Ga. 116, 65 S.E.2d 400 (1951).
Swofford v. Glaze, 207 Ga. 532, 63 S.E.2d 342 (1951).
207 Ga. 584, 63 S.E.2d 373 (1951).
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seems to narrow the scope of the remedy unnecessarily. One who threatens
to kill in order to gain by it, should have no consideration from equity
merely because the victim was so cowed by the threats that she did not
take advantage of an opportunity to expose the threatener.
Parties.-In a suit by a wife to cancel a deed from her to her husband
for a one-third interest in a tract of land,21 a creditor of the husband who
did not show the value of the husband's two-thirds interest, nor that there
was no other property from which the creditor's debt could be satisfied,
was not entitled to intervene in the suit.
Evidence.-In two cases the court held that the evidence as to mental
incapacity and great inadequacy of consideration, " and as to fraud,-1 was
sufficient to sustain verdicts for cancellation. In the latter case it was also
held that the evidence showed that grantee took the deed with knowledge
of the insanity of grantor so that the guardian was entitled to cancellation
without tender or offer of restitution of the consideration.
Petition.-In Sellers v. Johnson, 21 the petition was held insufficient to
charge fraud under the well-established rule that general allegations of
fraud are insufficient; the facts on which they are based must be stated.
REMOVING CLOUD

FROM

TITLE

Petitioner's Tiilc.-Petitioner to remove a cloud from title need establish title only back to the common source, and where the evidence showed
such title and that the claimant's only right derived from one given permission by the common source to use the property, petitioner was entitled
to relief, though he did not trace his title back to its source. 3
Mode of Trial.-Where a suit to remove cloud from title was heard
by an auditor by consent, and exceptions to the report were overruled by
the court and the report made the judgment of the court, the order became
the final judgment. Since the suit was originally in equity, it was2 not necessary to submit to a jury issues of fact raised by the exceptions.
APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVER

Suit by Unsecured Credilor.-Two cases decided within the past year
have involved the application of Code Section 55-IO6 providing that a
receiver shall not be appointed at the suit of an unsecured creditor, and
the recognized exception to it permitting such an appointment in cases
where extraordinary circumstances require it. In United Bond and W/arehouse, Inc. v. Jackson2 7 the court held that an unsecured creditor was not
entitled to the appointment of a receiver without a showing that a manifest
21.

Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Crowley, 207 Ga. 515, 63 S.E.2d 215 (1951).

22. Fuller v. Stone, 207 Ga. 355, 61 S.E.2d 467 (1950).

23. Thomas v. Dumas, 207 Ga. 161, 60 S.E.2d 356 (1950).
24. 207 Ga. 644, 63 S.E.2d 904 (1951).
25. Foster v. Adcock, 207 Ga. 201, 60 S.E.2d 334 (1950).
26. Farrar v. Ainsworth, 207 Ga. 185, 60 S.E.2d 366 (1950).
27. 207 Ga. 627, 63 S.E.2d 666 (1951).
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wrong was imminent, and a mere showing that property stored in the
warehouse would bring more at private sale by a receiver than at a public
sale by the warehouseman to discharge his lien is not sufficient. In Oattis
v. WJ/est Fiew Corp." the court held that a showing that a judgment for
petitioner against defendants had been set aside solely because it was excessive, and that the individual defendant, who controlled the corporate
defendant was selling all of the property of the latter intending to transfer
the proceeds to his children so as to render himself and the corporation
insolvent did not allege such extraordinary circumstances as to bring the
case within the exception. The United case was clearly sound, but the
allegations of the Oattis case, if true, would seem to show that "a manifest wrong" was imminent.
ENJOINING ACTIONS AT LAW

Right to Relief.-One who is in possession of land in good faith cannot,
after his claim has been held invalid by the court, have an injunction
against a dispossessory suit for the purpose of protecting his claim for
reimbursement for payments on encumbrance and for taxes and improvements. 9 It is not clear from this syllabus opinion whether the court is
holding that the possessor is not entitled to recover such payments or
merely that he cannot retain possession to secure such recovery; none of
the cases cited discuss that point. Generally, equity will give to such a
possessor a lien to secure repayment of the amount by which his expenditures have benefited the property3 and such lien would give a right to
retain possession.
The payee-endorser of a note with recourse cannot have a suit on the
note brought against him by the endorsee enjoined because of an agreement the endorsement was to be without recourse, since equity will not
enjoin an action at law on a ground that law would recognize as an equitable defense." Code Section 55-103 is treated as making the equitable
defense at law exclusive of the right to sue in equity to enjoin.
Procedure.-A dispossessory proceeding in which there is a counteraffidavit and bond is within Code Section 3-112 allowing a suit to enjoin.
a pending proceeding to be brought in the county of the pending suit."
SUITS TO ENJOIN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Condemnation Proceedings.-Sincethe question of the right to condemn
property cannot be raised in the condemnation proceedings, it has to be
raised in a suit to enjoin the proceedings." In this case the right to con-demn was sustained.
In Georgia Power Co. v. Fountain4 three opinions were written, no
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

207 Ga. 550, 63 S.E.2d 407 (1951).
Graves v. Carter, 208 Ga. 5, 64 S.E.2d 450 (1951).
See Note, 31 CoL. L. REV. 1335 (1931).
Peavy v. General Sec. Corp. 208 Ga. 82, 65 S.E.2d 149 (1951).
West View Corp. v. Thunderbolt Yacht Basin, 208 Ga. 93, 65 S.E.2d 167 (1951).

33. Hagans v. Excelsior Electric Membership Corp., 207 Ga. 53, 60 S.E.2d 162 (1950).
34. 207 Ga. 361, 61 S.E.2d 454 (1950).
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one of them commanding the assent of a majority of the court. Three justices held that where petitioner, after his petition in equity to enjoin condemnation proceedings was denied, participated in the proceedings to
determine the value, though he refused to accept payment of the award,
he was barred by estoppel and election from thereafter pursuing his
equitable suit to determine the necessity for the condemnation. One justice
concurred in the result on the ground of petitioner's laches. Three justices
dissented. The effect of the application of the rule of the first opinion is
to force the petitioner either to abandon his claim that there is no right
to condemn, or to refrain from participation in the proceedings to award
damages, which will result in denying him an opportunity to be heard if
the denial of the injunction is affirmed.
Where an injunction pendente lite against condemnation proceedings
was denied on the pleadings, which merely alleged and denied, respectively,
the necessity for the taking, the Supreme Court will not hold that the trial
judge abused his discretion in denying the injunction."
Tax Proceedings.-A provision in a municipal charter for contest of
tax executions by affidavit of illegality furnishes an adequate remedy so
that the executions will not be enjoined for invalidity of the ordinance
levying the tax.36
Under Code Section 92-790i, an injunction will not lie against the levy
or collection of a municipal tax unless the facts clearly require it. It was
held in Kent v. Aurphey 7 that where it appears that the city commissioners
acted on a digest of the tax assessors, though one improperly made, does
not sustain an injunction in the absence of any showing that the tax will be
unequal, unfair or excessive.
8 applied
Fence Election.-Hughes v. Griner"
the rule that, while equity
will declare invalid any fence election where there was a failure to comply
with the mandatory requirements such as the filing of the petition and the
giving of notice, it will not relieve against mere irregularities unless the
result was affected thereby, by refusing relief for failure of the election
managers to take the required oath. If the holding of the elections in
certain precincts at schools instead of courthouse.as required, is sufficient
to invalidate the vote of those precincts, it does not invalidate the entire
election without a showing that the vote of those precincts affected the
result.
ENJOINING PROSECUTION UNDER INVALID ORDINANCE

Injury to Property.-In Moultrie Milk Shed, Inc. v. City of Cairo9 the
court stated that in two recent cases "we undertook to put at rest all uncertainty as to the circumstances under which equity would enjoin a criminal prosecution. It was there pointed out that an exception to the general
rule is when injury to property is threatened, and when this is true, in35. Verner v. DeKalb County, 207 Ga. 436, 61 S.E.2d 921 (1950).
36. City of Eatonton v. Peck, 207 Ga. 705, 64 S.E.2d 61 (1951).

37. 207 Ga. 707, 64 S.E.2d 49 (1951).
38. 208 Ga. 47, 65 S.E.2d 24 (1951).
39. 206 Ga. 348, 57,S.E.2d 199 (1950).
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junction will lie notwithstanding the fact that in the process a criminal
prosecution is enjoined." The fact that four cases have been brought to
the Supreme Court during the past year in which this question was involved
indicates that the hope expressed in the Moultrie case has not been realized.
In one of the four cases,' the only injury alleged was the fact that petitioner had been arrested twice and other arrests were threatened. There
being no showing of injury to property, the injunction was not granted.
In the other three cases some property injury was clear and the trial court
granted the injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed in one of the cases
and reversed in the other two. In City of East Point v. Minton4 the
ordinance attacked as denying constitutional rights was one closing a
trailer camp operated by petitioner. Arrests had been made. The injunction was affirmed. In Mayor of Jlhens v. Co-Op Cab Co." the ordinance
which prohibited taxicabs from cruising for passengers along streets along
which a city bus line ran, was attacked as violating the state statute regulating taxicabs. No arrests were alleged to have been made under the
ordinance. The two cases were decided on the same day, with the concurrence of all of the justices in each; the injunction in the East Point case
was affirmed and that in the Athens case reversed. Neither case. made
any reference to the other so the distinction between them was not pointed
out by the court. Some of the language might lead to the conclusion that
the distinguishing fact was that arrests had been made under one ordinance,
but were alleged to have been merely threatened under the other, but that
is contrary to the general holding that the remedy at law is more generally
adequate after arrests have been made and the invalidity of the ordinance
can be determined by a defense to the prosecution following that arrest,
which the court followed in the third of the three cases decided a month
later. In that case 43 petitioner alleged that he had induced an employee
to violate the ordinance to make a test case, and the injunction was reversed on the ground that no reason was shown why he could not have
the validity of the ordinance determined in that test case. It seems to be
clear from these cases that the rule stated in the Moultrie Milk Shed case
must be restricted by the further requirement that the injury to property
must be one for which thQ remedy at law is inadequate, a qualification which
the court could properly assume would be read into it; and that the petition
on which an injunction is based should set out in detail the facts which
establish the injury to property, omitting or stressing only lightly the personal injury from arrest, and also detail the facts which make any remedy
at law inadequate. Mere averments of conclusions that property will be
injured and the remedy at law is inadequate will not suffice.
INJUNCTION AGAINST TORTS

Trespass to Land.-In Pruitt v. Satterfield" it was held that the petition and evidence sufficiently showed trespass by defendant on petitioner's
40. City of Eatonton v. Peck, 207 Ga. 705, 64 S.E.2d 61 (1951).
41. 207 Ga. 495, 62 S.E.2d 911 (1951).
42. 207 Ga. 505, 62 S.F.2d 906 (1951).
43. City of Bainbridge v. Olan Mills, Inc., 207 Ga. 636, 63 S.E.2d 655 (1951).
44. 207 Ga. 25, 59 S.E.2d 907 (1950).
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land so as to entitle the latter to a verdict and an injunction, but not to
show any damages. In Pugh v. Moore5 petitioner's showing of the execution of a deed since lost, which conveyed the land to petitioner and another
whose whereabouts were unknown, and that the remedy at law would require a multiplicity of suits was held sufficient to sustain a temporary
injunction against the cutting of timber.
Magnum v. Millwood'6 held that one who had merely a privilege or
right to cut timber on the premises, but not title to the premises nor possession, cannot have an injunction to restrain the cutting of the timber by
another. The cases cited to sustain the holding lay down the proposition
that one who has not title to, nor possession of, the subject matter is not
entitled to an injunction to protect it. This is generally true, but in the
case of the contract right to cut timber on the premises of another, there
might be a showing of special need for that timber which would entitle
petitioner to specific performance of the contract and then he ought to be
given an injunction to prevent another from interfering with the performance of the contract. The report of the Magnum case shows no attempt to
make such a showing so the remedy at law for breach of the right would
be adequate.
Obstruction of Easements.-In Haney v. Sheppard" it was unanimously
held, contrary to the language of some earlier decisions, that equity will
not grant a mandatory injunction for the removal of obstructions to an
alley since the statutory proceedings at law furnish an adequate remedy.
Equity may grant relief to prevent a multiplicity of suits but an allegation
of three obstructions to the same alley by the same defendant does not
show a multiplicity of suits would be necessary since all the obstructions
could be removed in one statutory proceeding. In Thompson v. Hutchins8
equitable relief to prevent multiplicity of suits was sustained. The case
was distinguished from the Haney case in that here the petitioner showed
an intent by defendant to take over the road and appropriate it to his own
use. One justice dissented. The distinction is a sound one. Multiplicity of
suits is more likely to be necessary where there is a showing of a claim of
right by defendant, or a purpose to appropriate the property to his own
use, than it is when the obstruction is merely casual.
Where the cross action prayed to enjoin a nuisance on defendant's easement, and it had been ruled in the case that the mandatory relief which
Code Section 55-I io prohibits was not sought, it was error to give the provisions of that section in the charge to the jury."
Delay in suing to restrain violations of an easement by the construction
of buildings thereon, until after the buildings were constructed, though
petitioner knew of such construction, was such lack of diligence as to bar
the right to enjoin the maintenance of the buildings."
45.
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49. Georgia Power Co. v. Green, 207 Ga. 250, 61 S.E.2d 146 (1950).
50. Head v. Crouch, 207 Ga. 648, 63 S.E.2d 647 (1951).
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Violations of Zoning Ordinance.-In Reed v. White5 it was held that
adjoining property owners may have an injunction against violation of a
zoning ordinance and that the allegations of the petition and the evidence
sustained a directed verdict for petitioner. The Supreme Court cannot set
aside the injunction on the ground that a later ordinance authorized the
use, since that court is only an appellate court.
A resident of a zoned district can sue to enjoin the violation of a zoning
ordinance on the claim that an amendment of the ordinance was invalid
without being relegated to certiorari, since the latter will not lie where
the attack is on the validity of the ordinance."
ACCOUNTING

A petition which alleged that petitioner was a tenant at will under an
agreement by which he was to pay a monthly rental at the termination of
his tenancy, and that there should be credited against the rent then due all
expenditures made by the tenant for improvements and repairs on the
premises, with an itemized statement of the amount of such expenditures,
was sufficient to sustain a right to an accounting in equity to prevent a
multiplicity of suits, under Code Section 37-301.
DISCOVERY

A petition for discovery in aid of a condemnation suit under Code Section 38-iOII, does not show that the remedy at law is inadequate where
it does not show that the evidence sought is necessary, not merely convenient or beneficial. 4
ENFORCEMENT OF EQUITABLE DECREES

Contempt Proceedings.-An order committing for contempt for failure
to pay alimony will not be reversed on ground nonpayment was not wilful,
where the record does not show conclusively that defendant will be unable
to comply with the order."
Ancillary Injuntion.-It was error in divorce proceedings to enjoin
the husband from disposing of his property pending the final decree where
there was no showing that the husband had any intent to make such disposition.5"
Subrogation.-A possessor in good faith, but without title, cannot be
subrogated to liens for taxes and encumbrances paid by him, since he was
207 Ga. 623, 63 S.E.2d 597 (1951).
Hardin v. Croft, 207 Ga. 115, 60 S.E.2d 395 (1950).
53. West View Corp. v. Thunderbolt Yacht Basin, 208 Ga. 93, 65 S.E.2d 167 (1951).
54. Georgia Power Co. v. Owen, 207 Ga. 178, 60 S.E.2d 436 (1950).
55. Simmons v. Simmons, 208 Ga. 51, 64 S.E.2d 896 (1951).
56. Brannen v. Brannen, 208 Ga. 88, 65 S.E.2d 16i (1951).
51.
52.
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a volunteer in making the payments, having no interest in the property to
protect. 7 This holding is contrary to the modern tendency to give more
liberal interpretation to the right to subrogation.
Review.-In a suit for partition, a cross bill based on an agreement
giving defendant the right to purchase the property does not make the
case one which can be reviewed in the Supreme Court. 8 Duckworth, C. J.,
dissented on the ground that the cross action gave the Supreme Court
jurisdiction even though the allegations were not sufficient to warrant
relief.
57. Graves v. Carter, 208 Ga. 5, 64 S.E.2d 450 (1951).
58. Alderman v. Crenshaw, 208 Ga. 71, 65 S.E.2d 178 (1951).

